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CODES OF CONDUCT AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: 
AN IN-PROCESS ASSESSMENT
Brian Rappert
Codes of conduct have received a significant amount of attention in recent years as a policy option to address concerns
about the relation between life science research and the deliberate spread of disease through biological weapons. While the
term code of conduct has functioned as a generic umbrella phrase for an array of different types of codes, in general, such
codes seek to set expectations regarding thinking and behavior for those associated with the life sciences. The purpose of
this article is fourfold: (1) to survey recent developments, specifically with respect to “universal” and “scientific society”
types of codes; (2) to propose criteria for assessing these initiatives; (3) to evaluate activities undertaken to date on the ba-
sis of these criteria; and (4) to propose key questions for the future. Overall, a mixed assessment is offered of the achieve-
ments of code-related activities to date. As argued, because of this overall situation, in the future careful attention should
be given to what is sought out of this option and how it can be realized in practice.
1
THE INTENSIFICATION OF CONCERN about bioweapons(BW) in recent years has raised many challenging
questions about the relationship between security and the
life sciences: How might the findings, materials, and tech-
niques of civilian research facilitate the development of
biological weapons? How serious a threat is posed by such
possibilities? What are the personal and professional re-
sponsibilities of those in the life sciences to prevent the
deliberate spread of disease? How should national and in-
ternational security considerations factor into research pri-
orities and practices?
All of these thorny questions and many others besides are
potentially implicated in discussions about the utility of
“codes of conduct.” While codes vary in purposes and con-
tent, by promoting more or less definite expectations they
seek to affect thinking and practice. Located at the intersec-
tion of relations between science, government, and society,
the establishment and promulgation of codes raises many
questions about who needs to do what and how to reduce se-
curity concerns. Attention to codes of conduct might be
deemed a fairly recent or a longstanding phenomenon de-
pending on one’s sense of history and criteria of relevancy.
But there is little doubt that since 2001 interest in this policy
option in relation to biosecurity has increased significantly.
In certain respects, however, notions about the place and
purpose of codes are still emerging. At this writing, the Na-
tional Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)—
charged with developing formal recommendations to the
U.S. government for minimizing concerns associated with
“dual-use” knowledge1—has as yet only issued draft guid-
ance considerations for a code. International deliberation
about this option is almost certain to continue, given the
agreement from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention (BTWC) 6th Review Conference that in 2008
States Parties will meet to discuss and promote common
understanding and effective action on:
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(iv) Oversight, education, awareness raising, and
adoption and/or development of codes of conduct
with the aim to prevent misuse in the context of ad-
vances in bio-science and bio-technology research
with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by
the Convention.2(pg21)
With the likelihood of continuing attention, various ques-
tions come to the fore: What specific gains might be
achieved through codes? How realistic are such prospects?
What sort of energy and resources should be committed to
pursuing this option?
This article surveys previous and planned code-related
initiatives to date in Western countries and by international
organizations. Owing particularly to the interest given to
this option in numerous national contexts and to the diffi-
cultly of capturing process-related achievements, providing
a fully comprehensive analysis of them is highly taxing if
not practically infeasible. As a result, this article seeks to re-
flect on the major trends in recent developments. In doing
so it proposes criteria for evaluating what has been done. It
then assesses activities undertaken so far on the basis of
these criteria. This is undertaken with a view to addressing
what experience to date indicates about the prospects for
codes. Particular emphasis is given the activities of NSABB
as a major body currently weighing its options.
PRELIMINARY POINTS
Some introductory remarks are required regarding the
types, purposes, and merits of codes. In current policy dis-
cussions, the phrase “code of conduct” has become a ge-
neric expression that refers to an array of options. I have
previously provided one initial classification scheme for
possible codes related to matters of biosecurity and biologi-
cal weapons in differentiating among three types:
• Codes of ethics: Aspirational codes that aim to set realistic
or idealistic standards as well as alert individuals to cer-
tain issues;
• Codes of conduct: Educational or advisory codes that aim
to provide guidelines for action, raise awareness of issues,
and foster moral agency;
• Codes of practice: Enforceable codes that prescribe or pro-
scribe certain behavior.3
Within the 2005 BTWC meetings that discussed “the con-
tent, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for
scientists,” a complementary scheme was forwarded to dis-
tinguish between layers of codes, including:
• Universal code: Consisting of brief aspirational general
principles that could be devised top-down and accepted
globally;
• Scientific society codes: Consisting of general statements of
obligations and responsibilities devised by societies and
other bodies that could raise awareness of relevant con-
siderations across their membership;
• Institutional or workplace codes: Consisting of fairly spe-
cific references to relevant laws, regulations, and required
procedures in certain organizations that would be most
relevant for its employees.4
The multiple classifications possible for codes highlight the
need to delineate what types are under scrutiny in any anal-
ysis. The comments that follow pertain to universal and sci-
entific society codes according the second scheme. Institu-
tional or workplace codes (e.g., individual corporate codes,
the International Council for the Life Sciences’ charter) are
excluded from the analysis unless otherwise stated. (Accord-
ing to the first classification scheme, this article considers all
three types, although the majority of attention is given to
the first two.)
Attending to classification schemes can help place valu-
able bounds on the domain under investigation. However,
preoccupation with what are ultimately contingent nomen-
clature schemes can cause unnecessary confusion as well.
So, in assessing prospects and problems, in the subsequent
sections much emphasis is given to the stated aims of codes
rather than what one should call them. In addition, it
should be noted that this article adopts a rather narrow def-
inition of what counts as germane, insomuch as it does not
treat any organizational biosecurity-related policy as an in-
stance of a code5 but reserves this term for those initiatives
likened to professional codes in other fields.
Before surveying initiatives, it is also worth making a few
preliminary points about the pros and cons associated with
codes.6 By drawing on a wide range of literature about
codes in general, I have examined the contrasting claims of-
ten made about their utility.7 On the one hand, both aspi-
rational and educational/advisory codes have been criticized
for being vague, open to multiple interpretations, ineffec-
tive to stop those with ill intent, of uncertain or question-
able practical worth, and often poorly known within pro-
fessional communities. On the other hand, such codes have
been said to fulfill a variety of purposes short of changing
behavior: raising awareness about topics to professionals
and the wider public, alerting individuals to specific sensi-
tive issues, fostering standards and ethical reflection, clarify-
ing responsibilities, and increasing public confidence.8
Much of the evaluation of enforceable codes turns on their
content and implementation. For all types of codes, the
process of devising and making them meaningful should be
considered alongside their content.
Additionally though, it should be kept in mind that to
state a particular type of code has certain advantages and
disadvantages is rather coarse. That a code is aspirational,
educational, or universal does not mean it thereby merits a
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particular evaluation. Rather, what matters is the specific
way in which an individual code is devised, adopted, and
made meaningful (or not). As such the merits of any code
are, at least in theory, open to revision and reversal over
time. To indicate the range of issues implicated in their as-
sessment, the phrase “code activities” rather than simply
“codes” is employed in thinking about matters of evalua-
tion.
CODE DEVELOPMENTS
Since the renewed interest in biosecurity-related codes in
2001, various efforts have been undertaken to recommend
or establish universal and scientific society codes. This sec-
tion surveys a number of such activities in Western coun-
tries and undertaken by international bodies. It does so by
distinguishing between the status of codes as advocacy,
adopted, or advisory. Although this is a somewhat arbitrary
division, it does enable useful groupings of activities and in-
dicates pertinent lines of contrast.
Advocacy denotes those codes that have been proposed by
academics and NGOs that are meant to be signed up to by
those associated with the life sciences. These differ in terms
of their primary objectives. For instance, Somerville and
Atlas’s nine-point Code of Ethics for the Life Sciences9 pro-
vides a succinct summary of key ethical issues designed to
engage science communities in “ethics talk”10 about what
constitutes responsible science. In 2002, a group of NGOs
led by the Federation of American Scientists produced pro-
visions for a biodefense code of conduct. In the main this
was meant to elaborate the meaning of the provisions of the
BTWC for biodefense programs.11 Through a 1989 pledge
against knowingly participating “in research and teaching
that will further the development of chemical and biologi-
cal agents,”12 and a more recent call for a ban on genetically
modifying naturally occurring organisms for military pur-
poses, the Council for Responsible Genetics has attempted
to demarcate appropriate from inappropriate work.13 In
2004, Pax Christi International specified the basic responsi-
bilities of a wide range of constituencies.14
For the purposes of this article, “adopted codes” refer to
those with elements specific to matters of biosecurity and
biological weapons agreed to by science (and also medical)
organizations. For instance, the International Union of
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology agreed a Code of Ethics
in 2005 that stated its members would not “engage know-
ingly in research that is intended for the production of
agents of biological warfare or bioterrorism, nor promote
such agents.”15 Also in 2005, the International Union of
Microbiological Societies General Assembly agreed word-
ing for a Code of Ethics for the Prevention of the Misuse of
Scientific Knowledge, Research & Resources and to encourage
its individual member societies to adopt it (for its word-
ing).16 In 2002 the American Society for Microbiology af-
firmed that its 1985 Code of Ethics regarded bioterrorism as
abhorrent,17 and in 2005 its Code of Ethics was revised to
makes this explicit.18 In the main, such adopted code provi-
sions have consisted of fairly short provisions affirming
widely established standards. An exception to this is the
American Medical Association’s Guidelines to Prevent
Malevolent Use of Biomedical Research that has become part
of its Code of Medical Ethics. Among other things, it recom-
mends physicians extend beyond adhering to existing stan-
dards to consider the need for new safeguards and oversight
mechanisms.19
In relation to advisory codes, a number of international
science-related organizations have deliberated what needs
to be done and decided not to produce and promulgate
codes of their own, but instead to provide text that might
enter into others’ codes. For instance, the InterAcademy
Panel’s (IAP) Statement on Biosecurity provides five short
principles that it recommends “should be taken into ac-
count in formulating codes of conduct.”20 Likewise, the In-
ternational Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotech-
nology (ICGEB) was tasked by the United Nations
Assistance Secretary for Disarmament with developing a
life sciences code of conduct related to weapons of mass de-
struction.21 While initially it sought to devise a code fo-
cused on individual scientists’ responsibility (in partnership
with the IAP), eventually it too in 2005 produced building
blocks for others’ codes.22 The International Committee of
the Red Cross’s (ICRC) Principles of Practice was meant to
bridge the gap between law and ethics overall and specific
codes.23 The 2005 Final Report of the Meeting of States
Parties to the BTWC stated a number of recognitions that
could inform codes elsewhere and in this sense could be cat-
egorized as “advisory.”24 As a final example, at the July 13,
2006, meeting of the NSABB, a draft document titled
Considerations in Developing a Code of Conduct for Dual
Use Research in the Life Sciences was agreed by members of
the Board.25
ASSESSING CODES
Such developments in the past few years mean that it is now
possible to do more than speculate on the theoretical pros
and cons of biosecurity-related codes by drawing on lessons
from other areas of professional conduct, but instead to as-
sess experience to date. Yet, the potential range of aims for
codes means the proper basis for assessment is an open
question and a topic that should be a matter of explicit at-
tention. In addition, the evaluation of activities embarked
on so far is problematic because doing so in a vigorous
manner would require extensive knowledge of the reception
and promulgation of codes in numerous contexts—from
the organizational meetings to research labs where they
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have been discussed—as well as an understanding of where
they have not been discussed.
As a result, the following section provides a broad
overview of the shape of major trends in recent develop-
ments while making the manner of their assessment a topic
for discussion.
Process
As noted above, the process of debating and devising codes
has been said to lead to many of their advantages for orga-
nizations and professionals. Regarding concerns about the
relation of life science research to bioweapon threats—
where lively debate has taken place regarding whether there
is a problem, what kind of problem it is, what sort of re-
sponse should be offered, and who needs to do it—such ad-
vantages are likely to be highly germane.
It is certainly possible to point to likely benefits from
code activities related to matters of process in their further-
ing communication, consultation, coordination, and col-
laboration between organizations. For instance, the meet-
ings of the BTWC in 2005, intended to “discuss and
promote common understanding and effective action,” as
well as preparatory meetings to the Convention26 were
quite exceptional arms control events in the manner in
which they brought together substantial numbers of scien-
tists, NGOs, professional bodies, research funders, publish-
ers, intergovernment organizations, and government repre-
sentatives across a wide range of countries to discuss the
proper governance of the life sciences. Set against the his-
tory of the relatively low participation of science-related or-
ganizations within the BTWC, the extent of engagement
undoubtedly improved the quality of deliberations. It may
well have established the foundations for future substantial
contributions by a diverse range of organizations and per-
haps even the BTWC institutional precedent for formal
participation by a wide range of stakeholders.27
Set against the history of the relatively low overall level of
attention to biological weapons within the life sciences, the
topic of codes has been amenable to increasing awareness of
a wider range of issues within science organizations.28 How
much the attention realized will translate into subsequent
action and for whom are important questions, but ones dif-
ficult to provide a definitive answer to at the moment.
Many of the process-related benefits of code activities will
have to be judged by their long-term, rather than short-
term, consequences, but it is possible to point to concrete
examples already. The involvement of the IAP & Interna-
tional Council for Science (ICSU) in code meetings leading
up to and in 2005 provided the basis for their subsequent
meeting in September 2006 with the British Royal Society
titled Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant
to the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention.29 The re-
sults of this meeting in turn fed back into the 2006 BTWC
Review Conference deliberations.
Content
Many criteria might be offered to evaluate the provisions of
codes, in part, owing to the multiple functions they might
serve. This article proposes two:
• Have codes helped clarify matters of uncertainty or dis-
agreement in the international prohibition of biological
weapons?
• Have codes contributed to the existing understanding of
what constitutes appropriate governance of the life sci-
ences?
With regard to the first, candidates for matters in need of
clarification would include what counts as allowable biode-
fense activities, the permissibility of mid-chemical/biologi-
cal spectrum “incapacitating” agents, a sense of the future
suitable direction for the BTWC, and the appropriate place
of technology transfer with the terms of the Convention.
Since the BTWC is written for states rather than individu-
als, what it should mean by way of individual action is not
always straightforward to determine.
With regard to the second question, the concern here is
whether codes set out standards or guides for practice above
and beyond what is already in place. Since they are often
presented as enabling the development of community
forms of governance more adaptive than inflexible statutory
regulations, this is a question of some significance. It is a
premise of this article that the absence of discernable con-
tributions related to these questions should give pause re-
garding the added value of the content of codes.
On the basis of these criteria, the value of recent activities
becomes less self-evident than it was for matters of process.
Most of those aspirational or professional/society codes that
make any reference to BW issues do so in passing fashion.
This is done, for example, by acknowledging the impor-
tance of the BTWC, noting in a general manner the re-
sponsibilities of professionals to follow relevant regulations,
and commenting on the deplorable status of bioweapons
and bioterrorism. In stating the need for deliberation about
new safeguards and oversight mechanisms, however, the
AMA’s code gestures toward something beyond the status
quo. Likewise, in calling for an effective BTWC verification
protocol, the World Medical Association’s Declaration of
Washington attempts to illuminate the proper path ahead
for international action.30
In relation to advocacy or advisory codes, the picture is
more promising. As suggested in the brief account of advo-
cacy codes in the previous section, many of them are in-
tended to elaborate or clarify standards for proper conduct.
However, as yet, none of these recommendations for codes
has been widely taken up. In limited and mixed ways, some
of the advisory ones from major national and international
bodies cited above also move further than the existing state
of affairs or, at least, suggest the need for those in the life
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sciences to attend to what needs doing. In this respect, of
note are the ICRC’s Principles of Practice, a non-status an-
nex to the Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties of
the BTWC prepared by its chair,31 and the NSABB’s draft
document Considerations in Developing a Code of Con-
duct for Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences.25
Education
Education is a topic that spans both content and process as-
pects of code-related activities. It would be hard to overstate
the importance accorded to these educative dimensions in
recent years. The content message of codes and the process
of their formation are often said to be able to foster reflec-
tion. In noting the heuristic value of code provisions, their
role in contributing to further activities is also crucial. In
this vein, it might well be argued that in examining content
detached from the concrete educational initiatives to pro-
mulgate codes, the previous subsection provided a rather
artificial treatment of the issues at hand. Indeed, along
these lines it could be noted that codes with highly indeter-
minate provisions evidently open to multiple interpreta-
tions might actually be a better starting point for encourag-
ing ethical reflection than more definite stipulations that
belie the contestable nature of ethical choices. Such a posi-
tion in support of indeterminate, general provisions has
been advanced in the deliberations of the NSABB regarding
its proposed position paper.25,32 Likewise in relation to
matters of process, it can be argued that the educational
benefits of codes will only fully emerge through continually
engaging communities with codes at a large scale such that
reflections about them and their subsequent revision means
they become living documents.
Yet, plausible arguments of this kind simultaneously un-
derscore the vital role of sizeable educational efforts to real-
ize any potential associated with codes. Various questions
follow: Who has carried out code-related educational ef-
forts? How have or could those be undertaken? How might
they be evaluated?
In relation to the first question, it is difficult to identify
many examples of advocacy, advisory, or adopted codes
having been incorporated into specific educational initia-
tives by professional organizations or others. But there are
limited examples that can be pointed to if education is
broadly defined. The high-level informal roundtables held
by the ICRC for representatives in government, industry,
and academia that centered on the theme of “Biotechnol-
ogy, Weapons and Humanity” might be counted as one ex-
ample. A workshop in October 2006 held by the UK gov-
ernment and involving professional societies talked about
the outcomes of the 2005 BTWC meetings as well as exist-
ing relevant British institutional codes with some 70 scien-
tists.33 Yet, overall, although the educational potential of
codes is widely agreed, efforts to employ those codes as part
of specific activities affecting numerous practicing re-
searchers or students have so far been rather muted. Un-
doubtedly resource constraints and competing demands
have restricted opportunities for substantial educational ini-
tiatives that reach large audiences. Depending on how
codes are incorporated into to-be-devised biosecurity edu-
cation programs that the NSABB is mandated to provide
advice on, the U.S. might be engaged in the most signifi-
cant efforts to include codes within formal educational ac-
tivities (though see the next section).
With any efforts at educating through codes, certain key
questions of how this should be done will need to be ad-
dressed. At a basic level, any attempt to educate faces the
question of what is meant by education. This can range in
purpose from attempting to impart a particular authorita-
tive understanding to attempting to enable individuals to
make sense of issues for themselves.34 Stated somewhat dif-
ferently, an important issue for future attempts to use codes
in education is whether such activities are intended to call
into doubt prevalent ways of thinking about life science–
biosecurity issues. Different responses are suggested by the
types of codes surveyed in the second section. To the extent
codes are brought into concrete educational activities, these
issues will become more acute. As part of this, the question
of what could and must be taken from codes (as opposed to
what is merely proposed in them) will be more prescient.
Another rather generic education consideration is how
any desire to challenge prevalent ways of thinking can be
reconciled with the often-expressed desire not to impose
burdens on the research process. The latter has been a
strong imperative in the deliberations of the NSABB as well
as the meetings of the BTWC. So again, speculative claims
about the prominent place for codes in education raise
many issues in practice.
As well, while claims about the potential educational
value of professional codes are often made, there has been
little evaluation of science codes in general.35 Nor is there
much evidence that suggests such codes have acted as the
“living documents” they are often described as being—for
instance, by being frequently revised and widely known
within professions.7,36 These points raise basic questions
about the likely overall utility of work in this area, barring a
concerted departure from past practice.
THE NSABB AS A CASE STUDY
By way of illustrating the themes of the previous section,
this one examines current deliberations in the NSABB. As
part of the chartered mandate “to provide advice to federal
departments and agencies on ways to minimize the possibil-
ity that knowledge and technologies emanating from vitally
important biological research will be misused to threaten
public health or national security,”25 the Board has been
asked to draft advice about the role of codes. Its Considera-
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tions in Developing a Code of Conduct for Dual Use Re-
search in the Life Sciences (hereinafter called Considera-
tions) represents its current draft advice.
In terms of content, the NSABB’s Considerations does
not directly speak to the status of the international prohibi-
tion of biological weapons, but its central concern is the
governance of the life sciences. Seen individually or to-
gether, the considerations specified do not provide specific
rules to be followed but rather flag general responsibilities
for individuals, institutions, professional bodies, and oth-
ers. Those duties relate to proposing, managing, reviewing,
conducting, collaborating, and communicating research as
well as educating individuals.
To elaborate, taken in isolation, the provisions set out in
Considerations provide an overall imperative to examine
dual-use issues through undertaking certain general tasks.
For instance, the core responsibilities identified specify that:
Individuals involved in any stage of life
sciences research have an ethical obligation
to avoid or minimize the risks and harm
that could result from malevolent use of
research outcomes.
Toward that end, scientists should:
• Assess their own research efforts for dual use potential
and report as appropriate;
• Seek to stay informed of literature, guidance, and re-
quirements related to dual use research;
• Train others to identify dual use research of concern,
manage it appropriately, and communicate it responsi-
bly;
• Serve as role models of responsible behavior, especially
when involved in research that meets the criteria for dual
use research of concern; and
• Be alert to potential misuse of research.25[bold in origi-
nal]
Given the historical background of the previous relative
dearth of attention to dual-use knowledge issues in the life
sciences, however general such responsibilities, the consid-
erations signal the need for a reexamination of the possible
consequences of research.
Taken against the other outcomes expected to arise from
the NSABB’s advice, however—such as the dual-use educa-
tion of scientists, the creation of communication tools, and
the development of an oversight framework for federally
funded research—the core and seven specific areas of re-
sponsibility identified in Considerations more restate the
need for a movement that should be achieved through these
other activities (and reaffirm the need to adhere to existing
regulations). Seen in this way, the considerations are less
consequential and compliance-oriented and more circular
than they might appear at first glance.
If the question “what’s novel?” is asked in the Considera-
tions, then the answer is likely to center on how its provi-
sions extend the range of whom it is deemed must reflect on
dual-use concerns. For instance, as part of the section Col-
laborating on Research, it is noted that modern science of-
ten involves multiple laboratories and that those involved
in collaborations have the responsibility of:
1. Engaging in open dialogue regarding whether knowl-
edge, products, or technology resulting from the re-
search could be considered dual use research of concern;
when such research is pursued, ensuring that all parties
are aware of their ethical responsibilities.25
In relation to international collaborations, this considera-
tion would seem to suggest the importance of U.S.-based
researchers engaging in dialogue with those not subject to
U.S. federal regulations and, thus, likely to be in an envi-
ronment where biosecurity concerns are not as widely aired.
In addition, the considerations given are meant to be ap-
plicable for publishers, life science societies, funders, and
private sector institutions that might not be subject to any
future NSABB-advised measures.
Assessing Considerations
Against the various content points in the previous section,
the advisory status of the NSABB’s code considerations
merits some attention. Because of the considerations’
largely reiterative function within the wider activities of the
Board, in some sense having the core and specific responsi-
bilities as advised modular options that can be added to
existing institutional or professional codes is a reasonable
approach. In theory, organizations can adopt any consider-
ation that might currently be missed. Having a dual-use
knowledge-specific code of conduct risks redundancy with
already adopted codes and thus imposes unnecessary bur-
dens. Also, that code considerations are advisory reduces
the likelihood they will be seen as imposed on high from a
Washington, DC–based board. If professional organiza-
tions or others speaking on behalf of the practicing research
community take the lead in devising codes, then they are
more likely than a government board to be seen as credible
in the current U.S. science policy climate.
However, against such possible advantages, a number of
disadvantages might be cited. The past and present limited
incorporation of biological weapons–related issues into
professional and society codes would suggest that it will
take quite a concerted effort to get any of the considerations
taken up. Based on past experience in the area of biosecu-
rity, and science codes more generally, it cannot be assumed
that the Considerations will be adopted. In the absence of
likely candidates to take up and implement them in a
meaningful manner (and it is not at all obvious to the au-
thor who such candidates would be), the wisdom of
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proposing advisory codes is questionable. Without a “who,”
the “why” looms rather large.
Another follow-on source of concern is the doubtful
value of the adoption of one or a few considerations by cer-
tain organizations. Because the individual considerations
are relatively abstract and indeterminate, they provide a
quite limited guide to action or even structure for debate.
Arguably, the main contribution of Considerations is not in
the precise upshot of its individual elements but rather the
overall imperative they form together to attend to dual-use
issues associated with research. Its main function is one of
signaling issues rather than imposing onerous require-
ments.
As a result, the selection and inclusion of only certain
provisions within existing science codes (to the extent it
happens at all, given the limited biosecurity-specific provi-
sions introduced in recent years) threatens to diminish a
major source of value of the responsibilities outlined. Even
if the core and specific responsibilities in Considerations
border on redundancy in the U.S. because they largely
highlight other forthcoming NSABB activities, a code in it-
self would further attention to dual-use matters. Of course,
if those matters were regarded negatively, then this would
have implications for the just what sort of signal was re-
ceived.
Certainly, a code for U.S. federally funded research
would set a notable example in the wider international
arena. If this code applied to all federal biodefense research,
then this would set a quite notable example within the
BTWC. In contrast, advisory elements with no defined
route for adoption and implementation would seem to have
rather less exemplary potential. In this regard, it is worth re-
membering that the suggestion that codes could aid in pre-
venting the hostile use of the life sciences is not a new
one.37,38 Yet, despite past calls, little by way of tangible
measures followed. Arguably, the lack of prominent cham-
pions was one of the most significant reasons why various
calls for them did not go much further. Globally, some col-
lective leadership was supplied by the BTWC meetings in
2005 in signaling the importance of biosecurity issues for
life science research. However, further efforts are required.
Thus, if one assumes a general value in codes, then the de-
cision by the NSABB not to offer a dual-use code is a re-
grettable one in relation to present international develop-
ments. Distinctive national leadership may come from
elsewhere. The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences has established a committee on biosecurity, sup-
ported by the Ministry of Education. That committee is
tasked with devising a national code of conduct by summer
2007.
Much of the future utility of the Considerations for the
U.S. science communities at large will hinge on how its ele-
ments are or are not incorporated into yet-to-be-devised
biosecurity education programs that the NSABB is man-
dated to provide advice on. Even if Considerations provi-
sions are not formally taken up within professional codes,
they could be used as part of the education of researchers
(as is envisioned for the NSABB’s Tools for the Responsible
Communication of Research with Dual Use Potential). Just
how this is done will mean much for whether the points
given are used as a springboard for furthering individual
and organizational dialogue and reflection, a reference sum-
mary account of compliance requirements for federally
funded researchers, or an irrelevancy.
DISCUSSION
Overall then, the previous sections have suggested a rather
mixed evaluation of code-related activities undertaken so
far. This topic has been an adaptable and encompassing one
that has provided a space for furthering communication,
consultation, coordination, and collaboration among a
wide range of individuals and organizations. However, as
one moves from matters of process to content, the situation
is less sanguine. On the one hand, where the content of
proposed codes offers significant contributions to current
understandings, they have not been taken up widely. On
the other, much of the official work by prominent organi-
zations remains advisory in nature—more prelude than
practice it might be said. On the crucial educational role ac-
corded to codes, the work of translating them into concrete
initiatives is still to be done. Additional points likewise sug-
gest the need for continuing attention and effort. Of the 22
of 69 academy members who responded to a recent IAP
questionnaire about the implementation of its Biosecurity
Statement, by early 2007 only five had set up groups within
their academy to take the issue further. Only three were
considering or in the process of issuing a national code re-
lated to biosecurity (i.e., Albania, France, and the Nether-
lands).39 The overall mixed and modest status of activities
to date underlines the need for careful consideration.
Having noted the preliminary, “to date” status of the
claims of this article, the question might well be asked:
How much additional effort should be dedicated to devis-
ing and promulgating codes in the future? There is little
doubt that general interest continues in them as instru-
ments for addressing the intersection between BW and life
science research.40,41 As an indication of this interest, they
were flagged in a report of the Royal Society-IAP-ICSU
Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the
Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention meeting as im-
portant for promoting responsible stewardship of research,
educating scientists, and managing sensitive research (at
least by some participants).29 The decision to convene a
meeting of State Parties to the BTWC in 2008 that in-
cludes codes will ensure they remain relatively high on the
international agenda in upcoming years.
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So in relation to concerns about the extent and direction
of additional efforts, it can be noted that while recent atten-
tion to this option has had its benefits, there have been (op-
portunity) costs as well. The added advantages that could
be gained by continuing endeavors should be considered
against the prospects for attaining these and the likely exer-
tion required. Reasons have been offered in this article for
pause regarding the extent of expected outcomes from addi-
tional efforts, barring a significant departure from past
practices.
As part of any future undertakings, it will be important
to acknowledge and seek to overcome those constraints
(particularly associated with the life sciences, as opposed to
the medical sciences) that mitigate the possibility of realiz-
ing particular outcomes. This is especially important be-
cause, to date, many policy forums have placed the advan-
tages of codes at the forefront rather than giving parity to
the reasons for doubting their practical utility or even ulti-
mate desirability. For instance, at the 2005 BTWC Meet-
ing of Experts, statements by States Parties, presentations
by intergovernmental organizations, and submitted na-
tional working papers overwhelmingly made highly opti-
mistic and confident claims about codes as policy options.
Concerted attention to possible weaknesses or limitations
associated with this option were largely, though not com-
pletely, absent.42 At one level this focus on prospects rather
than problems was understandable, given the commitment
going into the meetings to seek to move forward with this
option. Yet, it stood against the rather mixed overall evalu-
ation of previous code activities by social scientists and ethi-
cists and threatened to draw attention away from the fac-
tors that reduce the value of these activities.
In terms of constraints, as already mentioned, resource
considerations have no doubt hindered the awareness rais-
ing and educational functions. The nontrivial demands of
introducing codes into teaching or other provisions (pri-
marily because of the lack of BW education in the first
place) mean their benefits in this regard should not be as-
sumed. In addition, the fragmentation of the international
life science professional organizations—that any player is
just one among many others—hinders the coverage that
could be achieved by individual code initiatives. Further,
key bodies with the potential for extensive impact (e.g.,
NSABB) have deemed others with less range of formal au-
thority more appropriate voices. Other constraints, such as
the ones within science organizations that prevent the de-
velopment of BW/biosecurity–specific codes or any codes
at all are not self-evident but worth greater articulation.
Such attention would explain why, despite the interest in
codes by many prominent international and national orga-
nizations, in the main those bodies have shied away from
producing relevant codes. As mentioned previously, many
have sought to provide elements that could be incorporated
into codes to be developed by often unidentified (and non-
obvious) others.
Of course, these and other constraints are not permanent
features of the policy landscape; rather, they are to differing
degrees amenable to change. It is an open question ulti-
mately still to be decided whether activities to date come to
represent the beginning or the end of contemporary initia-
tives in this area.43 Such scope and the general preliminary
state of code actions point to the acute need for national and
international leadership to spur action and imagination.44
In the light of experience in recent years, this analysis
would also suggest that deciding about the merits and di-
rection of further attention to codes begs attention to the
prior question of what is sought from them. That attention
might take the form of seeking to be more specific about
policy objectives. If one agrees with the trend in recent
years to prioritize the educational, process-related value of
codes for practicing scientists, for instance, then it should
be addressed how codes could be part of comparatively ad-
vantageous efforts and what concrete plans are in place to
realize their pedagogical purposes. Without these, attention
to codes may prove redundant, ineffective, or diversionary.
However, public policy is not always as rational in its
course as pursuing specific ends in a deliberate manner.
Certainly one case that might be made for continuing at-
tention to codes is that this topic is amenable to keeping a
(albeit ill-defined) conversation going about a range of
tricky issues associated with science, security, and society.
This is a point no small relevance within forums such as the
BTWC. Since determining what needs doing in relation to
many BW/biosecurity–science issues is rather difficult,
codes may be valued as a way to sustain a conversation un-
til new ideas emerge, political will shifts, or wider events
lead to a new policy environment. It is the experience of the
author, for instance, that codes in general are supported
both by those pursuing them as a vehicle to encourage the
greater professionalization of biologists (e.g., an initial stage
to introducing professional licensing) and those seeking
them to forestall any further regulation. No doubt, the cur-
rent extent of agreement about the virtues of codes in gen-
eral would break down if their practical import became
more exact. In any case, if this more facilitating and search-
ing role is sought for codes, then this would suggest they
were more relevant as policy topics than as practical re-
search governance aids.
Whatever the roles sought for codes, experience to date
to would suggest that their potential to achieve laudable ob-
jectives should not be taken as a given. Their utility should
not be assumed, nor is their adoption inevitable. The ques-
tion is not so much one of whether codes are good or bad
policy options, but what commitments, means, motiva-
tions, and strategies are ready to be dedicated to making
them meaningful.
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